Questions and debates on authority during the English Civil War

The events of the 1640’s marked one of the most turbulent times in English History. With not one, or two, but three English civil wars that constituted the ‘entire’ civil war, it is understandable that this led to many poignant questions and debates about who should have authority in governance throughout the 1640’s. There are many questions posed during this period, such as the trustworthiness of the monarch, Charles I, how much power Parliament should wield, how much of an influence spiritual powers should have in contrast to temporal and how these questions interlink. Debates in the period were legion, the prevailing being that of issues over peace-making, and choosing where to pledge allegiance. Ultimately, these debates would lead to the execution of a ‘divinely ordained’ King, and one of the greatest shifts in political power that transformed the political landscape of Europe, ergo the world for the centuries to follow.

To begin then, with Charles I, and Parliament’s challenge to his prerogative in leading an army to Ireland. A number of factors had been influencing Parliament to challenge the divine right of kings, and elements of personal rule under Charles’s reign. These included protestations that Charles was being given bad counsel, chiefly from Archbishop Laud, that his wife held catholic beliefs, an unsympathetic and ‘scaremongering’ printing press, that most Englishmen alive in living memory had experienced the scare of invasion from an aggressive popish power. Further, in the spiritual aspects of his reign, a comparison between Laudinism and Catholicism would find many parallels in terms of use of idolatry and imagery, which to an ever suspicious population started to draw parallels to Laudinism. It is the context of this debate that matters more, as Shagan elaborates “Parliament, far from wanting to challenge royal authority, had accomplished most of its goals and was nearly ready to dissolve itself” yet with the outbreak of the Irish revolt, “were the king and parliament suddenly handcuffed together”[1] in having to raise an army. Together with criticism of the ship money tax, it provided Parliament with the political capital to challenge the king’s authority. Parliament manipulated the genre of papist plots by drawing these comparisons to royal policies and supporters[2], which perpetuated the debate. Charles I, did not help himself  as he responded by denying any involvement to allegations he was colluding to Catholics in England, and in Ireland, using the “language of order and deference while studiously avoiding the language of anti popery” [3] so that he did not alienate his potential catholic supporters In Ireland. Print escalated this, as a more literate population that had “internalised this symbolic language before 1641, however […] others had not, and this division largely determined which view […] they accepted.”[4]

It is interesting to note that a similar, though not as significant debate rose in 1644 surrounding the self-denying ordinance on the Parliamentarian side. The ordinance sought to present Parliament as defending the rights and liberties of the people, by removing politics from the new model army and so conducting the promotion of officers based on merit. Resources to supply the army through MP’s that could now return home to increase resources meant that supplying a standing army was now easier. It created more unified discipline within the ranks, allowing men to stand behind their commanders without political views interfering. However, the true effectiveness was presented in a joint military and propaganda victory, in capturing the king’s private letters afterwards, posing Charles as responsible for the war and not his ministers. This demonstrated God’s favour, simultaneously presenting the opportunity to concentrate on centralising government instead of constantly tending to a larger number of smaller forces.

 

Shaking off of monarchical rule in Scotland also raised huge debate. The factors central to this included the imminent imposition of episcopacy, and the common prayer book which was a key feature of the English church, and in more general Charles’ I’s absentee monarchy.[5] Question of authority was invoked when Scotland tried to resist uniformity by rejecting these religious measures. What was significant about the events in Scotland was that the “National covenant’s clear distinction between the office of the monarch and the person of the king sustained loyalty to the house of Stuart, but not necessarily to Charles I”[6]. This argument of Macinnes’ is evident in how popular the covenant’s oath of allegiance and mutual association was. “Subscribers made only a conditional commitment to the monarch, for true loyalty was reserved only for a covenanted king-that is, one who had himself accepted the contractual nature of his rule”[7]. Further by establishing the triennial act, and openly defying Charles was to set a precedent for England and Ireland. Because the Scottish Parliament could now meet regardless of royal summons, took over administrative acts such as taxing landed and commercial rents, establishing committees of war during the bishops war, Scotland had insulted the legitimacy of Charles’ reign in Scotland and exploited the weakness of Charles’ authority. Historians and contemporaries alike have attributed this to, as Hughes has stated, because he was ‘woefully inadequate’ as a monarch[8]. It is necessary to state that it was the nature of having to rule three kingdoms itself that was evidence of the weakening of monarchical authority. A list of grievances drawn up in the House of Commons in April 1640 gives us an early example of Parliament expressing its own authority. The third grievance: “as to the liberty and privileges of parliament, resolved that one head shall be the complaints that have been made touching the punishment of men out of parliament for things done in parliament, in breach of the privilege of parliament”[9].

That Parliament saw itself as responsible for what was traditionally the King's royal prerogative gives weight to that responsibility that began to fall on the respective parliaments, despite no integration between the three. This was the beginning of an alternative form of governmental ideal, Parliamentary privilege. Parliament was able to complicate the debate, albeit maybe not deliberately because of the changing ideals of the common good. As the research of an Early Modern Research group has concluded, “Commonwealth had become a keyword because its ambiguities gave it a creative adaptability. In a weak sense, it could be used to describe any polity. In a strong sense, it was used to discuss what form of polity was most conducive to the common good[10].” As evident in the nineteen propositions and list of grievances, use of the term commonwealth in defending liberties, meant that Charles could not dismiss the suggestions out of hand without tainting his own image. That Parliament in 1642 had for the first time ever, included around roughly 80 contested elections, gave a new found legitimacy, assisted by the bar for suffrage being capped at holding an income of 40s. or above, had been easily met due to inflation, encouraging dialogue between monarch and Parliament.

Widespread belief of Papist plots further undermined Charles’ authority which hindered his plans “to achieve one uniform order or religion within the three kingdoms[11].” With Presbyterian belief having firm roots in Scotland, it could be construed that the nature of its existence posed a challenge to Charles’ authority. Presbyterians, in the view of Peter Lake saw “the rule of one minister over another as a direct emanation of the pope’s tyrannical rule over the church[12].” Between 1638-9 this was apparent in how Presbyterian Scotland sought to export the covenant to England with the purpose of trying to get Charles I to endorse the covenant in all three kingdoms. “From the publication of the book of martyrs in 1563 until the Irish rebellion of 1641, Foxean rhetoric commonly resonated through English religious and political crises[13].” Because most of the population of England had been exposed to invasion scares since the reign of Elizabeth I, close association had been made between foreign aggression and Papists due to France and Spain following the Catholic faith. Because of the Scottish precedent the long parliament was able to call for the impeachment of Archbishop Laud which passed the commons unanimously. Parliament later implicated the king by tying him to similar papist scares; enabling it to consolidate its own support. The eruption into civil war and challenge to temporal authority is described well by John Morrill and Anthony Fletcher in Shagan’s ‘constructing discord’: “small, radical minorities disrupted the broad political consensus which had been so successfully displayed in the early months of the long parliament[14].” Other revisionists have also accepted that the problem of religious division perpetuated the conflict and an assault on the king’s authority[15].” It was not just with the king, that Presbyterian Scotland endured problems, but with Parliament too after the alliance pact and establishment with the solemn league and covenant. When signing the treaty, the English Parliament, aware of its diverse religious differences was vague in the wording of the signing, which the Scottish took as assent. The solemn league and covenant posed an alternative form of governance which did not necessarily need to include Charles I in its framework in order to operate, which hampered peace negotiations.

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The issue of peace-making was also an issue of contention throughout the Civil War. Debates over whose responsibility it was for the start and continuation of the war hampered negotiations throughout. For instance, talks in the winter period of 1642 until early 1643 were cut short when pamphlets began to appear criticising Parliament for trying to make peace when the king whom was being seen to infringe upon the rights and liberties, which as Parliament had not achieved much militarily, undermined their new found authority. Other considerations formed the framework with the issue of peace-making. The case of one of Charles I’s letters to Ormond however, demonstrates that in 1645 Charles thought a peace could be reached with Parliament: “Secondly, by dexterous conveying to the Irish, the danger there may be of their total and perpetual exclusion from those favours I intend them, in case the Rebels here clap up a pace with me, upon reasonable terms, and only exclude them, which possibly were not councelable for me to refuse, if the Irish peace should be the only difference betwixt us, before it is perfect there[16].” Such a letter is retrospective of how the three kingdoms were impacting on each other, though the problem for Charles lain in propaganda demonising the Irish Catholics for barbarous atrocities. As a consequence, after the capture of Charles’ letters there was no longer a need to make peace because the English population were able to read his printed letters with annotations. His marriage was also used to tie links to Catholicism and poor governance: “The Queen's Counsel are as powerful as commands. The King professes to prefer her health before the exigence, and importance of his own public affairs[17].” After this, the issue of peacemaking came to a close, but it shows as a conclusion to peacemaking how the issue damaged the King's reputation irrevocably. Due to already having suffered many years of scaremongering that the King had Catholic sympathies, the published letters seemed to provide the perfect proof in the allegations that had been made all along, and when the Irish landed on the Royalist side, provided a point of no departure for a proportion of Royalist commanders. “In any case, parliament routinely prepared for war while negotiating for peace.[18]”  While Parliament presented the King as doing the same and was successful at doing so, it demonstrates the contrapuntal relationship between fighting and negotiating, but to Parliament's benefit. Concluding peace with the King proved a more complicated debate. With the rise of ‘radical’ groups such as the levellers, and division among the Presbyterian’s and independents, Parliament became fractured in how it should make peace. Charles I also only surrendered to the Scottish, who tried to get him to accept the covenant. The nature of having two separate Parliaments trying to conclude peace with him, and many factions within England, meant that Charles was able to exploit the differing groups further. The lack of direction is transparent in the Newcastle propositions sent to Charles I, proposition 1 asks Charles to give “all such Bills as shall be tendered to your Majesty in pursuance of them, or any of them, may be established and enacted for Statutes and Acts of Parliament, by your Majesty's royal assent.[19]” This would infer that despite the numerous ordinances passed by Parliament whilst in wartime that Parliament still looked to the King to provide direction.

Choosing allegiance was a huge debate and affront to Charles' I’s authority. Parliament designed the protestation of 1641 as an attempt to create a more legitimate authority for itself, by creating three separate oaths included in the protestation; the oath of Supremacy, the oath of Allegiance, and the protestation itself. On the surface, the oath of supremacy confirms Charles as “the only supreame governor of this realm, and all his highness dominions and countries, as well in all spiritual and ecclesiastic things or causes, as temporal[20].” Similar rhetoric is used in all three parts of the protestation, requiring the swearer to begin swearing with “I… do in the presence of Almighty God, promise, vow and protest to maintain and defend”[21] which for contemporaries was a serious vow to make, as perjuring oneself was a spiritual crime that would have to be answered before God. The tract that gravitates the oath more towards Parliament is denoted by asking the subscriber to “promise, vow, and protest to maintain and defend […] the power and privileges of Parliament[22].” This was the first time an oath had been made to Parliament, which as Vallance argues raised concerns concerning its religious and political purpose, though he also admits that others simply viewed it as “an uncontroversial oath of loyalty in defence of the king and church[23].” Nevertheless, the protestation in 1641 did receive large public support, with returns to Parliament existing for all English counties bar four, though a certain ambiguity can be seen in the eyes of contemporaries. In Wales, with the exception of the county of Denbighshire, did not provide any returns to Parliament[24].  This is further reinforced by how Royalist writers at the time “affirmed the need to refuse oaths that the swearer suspected were unlawful.[25]”  Pre-war, debate at the time existed due to  potential religious ramifications of what the oath was asking or what direction the English reformation would take. It lacks however the hindsight of being able to see the protestation as an early attempt to reinforce Parliament's own authority. To this end, asking for equivocation or choosing to delay in swearing were used as a means of escaping punishment, in cases where individuals did not wish to swear at all.[26]Comparisons could be drawn however to the Vow and Covenant of 1643 which “contained no pretence that it was being made for the defence of the king’s honour and person” though Vallance does also raise the point that it allowed Parliament to uncover Royalists, and establish how zealous individuals were[27].

The emergence of the Militia Ordinances and Commissions of Array also created debate on whether Parliament could conscript men. The Letters of Thomas Knyvett, a political moderate, reflect how lower positions in the socio-political order responded. Referring to a commission from Commissary Mutford, Knyvett reflects how it was not his “place to dispute, so I took it and desired some time to advise upon it” and decides that if he receives further commands that would encroach on his obedience towards the king, that “I shall do according to my conscience […] and to stay out of the way of my new masters till these musterings be over.[28]”  The debate that followed challenged Charles’ right to be the only entity responsible for the raising and upkeep of military forces, met with mixed opinions. Again, Print was responsible for the perpetuation of this debate, and by claiming to be acting in the interest of the ‘common good’ Parliament was able to draw upon the broader population for legitimacy. In contrast, Charles’ resurrection of Commissions of Array which had lain dormant for over 100 years was more successful in raising forces in the short term, with Parliamentarian ‘territory’ being confined to the South East, Essex and London. The rest of the England and Wales, was in royalist control with many local garrisons which would give credence to that the Militia ordinances were at first not seen as entirely legitimate, until the Parliamentarians began to fight in royalist territories, and as “the evidence of Peter Newman and Ronald Hutton suggests that the Royalist armies were at least as thick with nongentle Junior officers as were the Parliamentarian armies[29].” *

Questions over who should control the army were arguably the most important theme of royal prerogative being challenged that sparked the civil wars. Whilst Governance, both temporal and spiritual, was used as a means to challenge authority, and contained attacks on royal prerogative in their own respective rights, these were used to sustain attacks upon Charles I’s authority in the broader theme of removing his constitutional rights. Peace-making and Choosing Allegiance have been a concurrent theme in the erosion of royal authority throughout the period, and as has been exemplified, dealt the death blow in promulgating Parliament’s supremacy.

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[1] Shagan, Ethan Howard. ‘Constructing discord: Ideology, Propaganda, and English responses to the Irish rebellion of 1641’ The Journal of British Studies, Vol.36, No.1 (University of Chicago Press: Jan. 1997) P.5

[2] Shagan, P.27

[3] Shagan, Pp.31-32

[4] Shagan, P.32

[5] Macinnes, Allan. ‘The ‘Scottish Moment’ 1638-45’ P.126

[6] Macinnes P.127

[7] Ibid

[8] Hughes, Ann. ‘The causes of the English Civil War’

[9] A list of Grievances, April 1640

[10] Early Modern Research Group, ‘Commonwealth: The social, cultural, and conceptual contexts of an early modern keyword.’ The Historical Journal, 54, 3, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) P.671

[11] Russell, Conrad. ‘The British Problem and the English Civil War’ (London: University College) P.399

[12] Lake, Peter. ‘Anti-Popery- the structure of a prejudice’ (Longman) P.77

[13] Shagan, P.11

[14] Shagan, P.32

[15] Adamson, P.

[16] Negotiations for enlisting Irish Catholics, 1645 [taken from The Kings Cabinet Opened, pp.16-17, July 1645. It contained letters written by Charles to various high-ranking officials on a number of issues.]

[17] The Kings Cabinet Opened: Or Certain Packets of Secret Letters and Papers written with King’s own hand (London 1645)

[18] Braddick, Michael. ‘Gods Fury, England’s fire’ (London: Penguin Group Ltd, 2009) P.383

[19] The Newcastle Propositions, http://www.constitution.org/eng/conpur066.htm, last accessed 9/12/16

[20] England’s Oaths: Taken by all men of quality in the church and commonwealth of England. The oath of Supremacy. The Oath of Allegiance. And the Late Protestation. Published by G.J. for satisfaction of his Parishioners.

[21] Ibid

[22] Ibid

[23] Vallance, Edward. ‘Protestation, vow, Covenant, and Engagement: Swearing allegiance in the English Civil War’ (Manchester: University of Manchester) P.411

[24] Ibid

[25] Vallance P.410

[26] Vallance, P.414

[27] Vallance, Pp. 415-6

[28] Thomas Knvyett’s dilemma over the Militia ordinance, 18/5/1642 [source: The Knyvett Letters, 1620-1644, ed.B. Schofield (London, 1949), pp.102-3]

[29] Morrill, John. Review on ‘The Ecology of Allegiance in the English Revolution. Revel, Riot and Rebellion’ by David Underdown. Journal of British studies, vol.26, No.4 (Oct.1987), Pp.451-467. Cambridge University Press on behalf of the North American Conference on  British Studies.

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